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THE CASE FOR
AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
JACOB

W. F.

SUNDBERG*

The 1970 Hague Convention, by providing the groundwork for an
effective internationallegal system, appearsto be an efficient multilateral
method for dealing with unlawful interference with civil aviation. Multilateral instruments have come under increasing attack, however, as
being out of date and inaccurate to solve the problems confronting the
international community. Arguably, these criticisms do not apply to
hijackings, since the only multilateral treaty prior to The Hague Convention was the Tokyo Convention, which did not, unfortunately, require prosecution and punishment of the offender, thus making any
comparison virtually useless. Nevertheless, there is merit to the argument that The Hague Convention did not go far enough. For example,
by not imposing penalties the same crime will invoke different treatment
in different countries, the scale of penalties ranging from three years
to life imprisonment and death. The result is undesirable and has been
characterized by Professor Evans as a form of "Russian roulette."
Alternatively, other methods of control include sanctions, the suspension
of services to and from the offending state, and the formation of an international court which would be given jurisdiction over any form of
hijacking, regardless of the state of the intended destination of the
offender. The latter-the creation of a world couri-forms the basis of
the final article in the symposium. Although a world court offers the
potential of greatly increased control, its possibilities have been largely
unrealized. Professor Sundberg argues that the explanation lies in the
lack of use; attention was turned to these courts only in exceptional
crimes. Maintaining that an international court should minimize the
evils inherent in a system that is largely political, the author concludes
with the belief that a world court is the most promising method of
achieving world-wide condemnation of the offense.

I. INTRODUCTION

T

HE RECENT upsurge in the number of aerial hijackings, while
difficult to explain, is inexorably linked to the state of hostility
characterizing the relationship between nations since the Second World
War. During the period immediately following the war, this hostility,
* Professor of Jurisprudence, University of Stockholm. J.D., University of Uppsala;
M.C.J., New York University; LL.D., University of Stockholm.
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fostered on both sides, put a premium on anyone who succeeded in
making his escape over the Iron Curtain. Hijacking generally took the

form of somebody escaping by air from Communist Europe into Austria,
Switzerland or West Germany by overpowering the pilot in flight and
forcing him to reroute over the Iron Curtain. From 1948 through 1950
seventeen instances of such hijackings were reported,' although some of

them may have been cases of pilots defecting with one-seater military
aircraft.' In the five years between 1968 and 1962 there were again

seventeen instances of hijackings,' two of them ending in fatal crashes.
An increase in the number of hijackings occurring in the Western Hemisphere, particularly involving American aircraft, resulted in the rise of
the Castro regime and the subsequent introduction of European conditions into the Western Hemisphere. When Fidel Castro had firmly established himself in Cuba, his supporters turned against American aviation.
A sequence of four hijackings in 1961 prompted the United States government to amend the Federal Aviation Act of 1958" with a provision
against "aircraft piracy. '
A sharp increase in the frequency of hijackings took place during the

remainder of the 1960s. American airliners were frequently diverted to
Cuba to deliver some hijacker; less frequently, a Cuban airliner was
hijacked by persons desiring to go to the United States. Most Latin
American countries experienced, with increasing frequency, the diver-

sion of their airliners to unplanned destinations. Colombia, with over a
dozen aircraft hijacked by September 1969, was the principal victim; in
each instance the chosen destination was Cuba.' Late in 1968 there was

a sudden increase in the number of hijackings. During that year, twenty' For a compilation of statistics, see Appendix, Table II infra at 231. See also
Evans, Aircraft Hijacking: Its Cause and Cure, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 695, 698 n.14 (1969).
' One case of some legal significance was the escape of pilot Ivo Kavic and one accomplice with a passenger-filled JAT DC-3 airliner on October 17, 1951. Kavic diverted
the aircraft from its assigned route, Ljubljana to Belgrade, and took it to Zurich. In re
Kavic, Bjelanovic and Arsenijevic, 1952 INT'L L.R. 371 (1952). Following this incident
Yugoslavia solved her problem of hijacking by opening up her borders, thus allowing
her citizens to leave the country. Since that liberation, no hijackings seem to have taken
place.
' See note 1 supra.
449 USC § 1472(i)(1) (Supp. 1971), amending 49 USC § 1472(i) (1964) (originally inacted as Act of Aug. 23, 1958, ch. 9 § 902, 72 Stat. 784).
' The most spectacular of these cases involved a Pan American DC-8 en route from
Mexico City to Guatemala City, carrying the Foreign Minister of Colombia and 81
other persons. The plane was hijacked to Cuba on August 9, 1961, by Albert Charles
Cadon, a Frenchman, as a reprisal against American interference in the French-Algerian
conflict.
6During the latter part of the 1960s the Mediterranean area also became the scene
of a number of hijackings. The abduction of former Congolese Prime Minister Moishe
Tshombe in a British air taxi owned by Air Hanson Ltd. over the high seas on June 30,
1967, introduced the game of rerouting aircraft to Arab destinations for political reasons.
The Tshombe hijacking was followed by Arab hijackings of Israeli, American and
Ethiopian planes and by dissident Greeks hijacking Greek flag airline.
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seven aircraft, involving 1,490 passengers, were diverted from their

scheduled routes by threat or force. During 1969, the number of hijacking incidents reached 89, involving 4,519 passengers. In 1970
there was no decrease in the frequency. Moreover, it became evident
that many European hijackings were part of a planned paramilitary
campaign which had chosen international civil aviation for its victim,

since its vulnerability and international character made certain that the
campaign would affect important interests throughout the world.! Thus,
in view of the existence of this direct link between hijacking and the

state of hostility in international society, it is difficult to disagree with
United Nations Secretary General U Thant's conclusion that "this is
only the beginning of an inexorable trend."8
Although the reasons why hijacking has become such a fashionable
crime are unclear, there is general agreement that the upward trend can-

not be checked if the offenders go unpunished." Therefore, it is necessary to take a close look at the relationship of the state of hostility and

the mechanisms of indictment and punishment in the criminal law. In
short, the purpose of this article is to answer the difficult problem of
finding the proper relationship between hijackings and their international

political environment.
An estimation of the relative importance of the political element will
first be explored. Hijacking cases are easily categorized as classical robbery, guerrilla warfare and escape cases." The great majority of cases
belong to the last category. Even when a hijacking is the result of a
deranged mentality, the choice of destination infects escape cases with

a political element. The hijacker always selects a political adversary of
7 By holding international civil aviation hostage, the planners, Marxist orientated
commando groups of exiled Palestinian Arabs, expected to gain important concessions
from the world at large. Indeed, the planners may look back upon 1970 as a successful
year. Whereas attacks prior to 1970 against airlines in Greece, Switzerland and West
Germany had cost the Arab commandos 13 prisoners and several dead (moreover
the European machinery of justice had started to pronounce lengthy jail sentences),
the 1970 attacks resulted in the Arab commandos securing the reelase of all 13 prisoners
simply by using the threat of hijacking against the Western European states. Half of
the prisoners were released as a quid pro quo for an Olympic Boeing 727, which was
hijacked on July 22. The remainder were released as a consequence of Operation Abu
Thalaat, the mass hijackings of New York-bound airliners on September 6 and the
hijacking of a BOAC VC-10 on September 9.
8Address by U Thant, United Nations 25th Anniversary Program New York City,
Sept. 14, 1970, Press Release SG/SM/1333, ANV/87 [hereinafter referred to as U Thant
Speech]. See also address by Kurt Hammarskjold, 25th Annual General Meetings of the
IATA, Oct. 20, 1969.
' "Until the perpetrators of hijackings and armed attacks face the certainty of apprehension and punishment we must expect these events to continue." U Thant Speech,
supra note 8.
10An example is Philippine Air Lines flight 158A of November 7, 1968, which ended
with the hijackers escaping from Manila International Airport with some $23,000
worth of stolen goods. The account of this is reported in Sundberg, La Piraterie Aerienne, 1970 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PENAL 165 (1970). See also note 1 supra.
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the flag state of the victimized airline as a destination; hijackings simply
do not take place between countries in harmonious relationship. The
political element is, therefore, one of the most important in the whole
hijacking problem.
Second, the problem of unlawfulness will be analyzed. Contrary to
popular assumption,' 1 there is not a body of law common to all nations,
which makes the test of "unlawfulness" a mere "technicality." Hijacking
is a perfect example." Hijackings generally consist of acts which technically are criminal according to the affected national legal systems. 3
Viewing the situation in this light there is no technical difficulty in
viewing hijacking as an appropriate target for a universal fight against
crime. Rather, the technical difficulty that exists in viewing hijacking as
a universal crime lies in converting this view into a practical reality.
The difficulty follows from the parcellisation of jurisdiction in a world
of concurrent jurisdictions. The classical solution, perhaps the only practical way of implementing this basic view, is to apply some variant of
the principle aut dedere aut punire. When the criminal is apprehended,
the apprehending government is liable either to extradite him to the
country the laws of which he violated initially or punish him within its
own jurisdiction.
Geneva Convention on the High Seas, opened for signature April 29, 1958 [1961]
OFFICIAL RECoRDs 84, and the criticism by M. McDOUGAL & W. BURxE, THE PUBLIC OaDER OF THE
OCEAN 811 (1962). Compare SIMONNET, LA CONVENTION SUR LA HAUTE MER 159
1"

13 UST 2312. Cf. the Greek intervention at the Geneva Conference, 4
(1966).

"See, e.g., Regina v. Martin, 2 Q.B. 272, U.S. & CAN. Av. R. 141 (1956). To the
British, hijacker Francis Bodenan may have been a criminal when he seized Air Hanson's
air taxi (although this is not certain, considering the state of English law at that time),
but viewing the situation from the standpoint of Algerian law he certainly was very
close to simply making a lawful private arrest. For a general review of the English
situation in 1959, see Cheng, Crimes on Board Aircraft, 12 CURRENT LEGAL PROB. 177
(1959). See also Sundberg, Relazione, 17 TRASPORTI AEREI 16 (1970); Sundberg, La
Piraterie Aerienne, 1970 INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PENAL 165, 168 (1970).
In many jurisdictions the rule allowing private arrest is slightly more extensive inasmuch as the very gravity of the crime itself will confer powers of arrest upon private
persons. Thus, under New York Code of Criminal Procedure, N.Y. PENAL CODE § 183
(McKinney 1968), a private person is allowed to arrest another when the person arrested has committed a felony. The same rule applies, it would seem, in England. See
P. DEVLIN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND 14 (1960). But see C. PRO.
PEN. art. 73 (64th ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1965) (France). If Nations were willing to
promulgate, as an accessory to their criminal law, legislation allowing the capture of
airliners outside the state's territory, these cases could easily multiply. Even if such
promulgation has not taken place recently, historically, the law of war permitted exactly that, so long as a state of war existed in some corner of the earth. Sundberg,
Relazione, 17 TRASPORTI AEREI 14 (1970). Normally, however a hijacking will not fall
in this category.
13Examples are kidnapping the persons on board, intentional violence, illegal possession of arms, causing deprivation of freedom, coercion, compromising aircraft safety,
compromising air lane safety and endangering human life.
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II. POLITICAL CONTROL
Political control is exercised over law enforcement in all countries.
In most, the state prosecutor has the power to enter a nolle prosequ,
and it is an accepted principle that the suspected criminal offender
should not automatically be the subject of prosecution without allowing
for considerations of public policy." The ICAO draft convention on
hijacking proceeded on the assumption that no absolute obligation to
prosecute should be imposed on the contracting states. 5 At The Hague
Diplomatic Conference in December 1970, attempts by the American
delegation to incorporate an absolute obligation to prosecute into the
Convention ended in the compromise "twenty-seven nations formula,"
which appears in article 7 of the Convention, "to submit the case to its
competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution." This formula is
believed to move the possible decision not to prosecute to the level of
the grand jury in the United States or to the level of the Attorney General in England. The formula seems to entail a less strict obligation to
prosecute than the obligation espoused in the Terrorism Convention of
1937: "terrorists shall be prosecuted and punished in the same manner
as if the offense had been committed on that territory." While Sweden
is one of the few countries that adheres to the principle of a strong duty
to prosecute, this adherence is more lip service than actual fact. Prosecution for a crime committed outside of Sweden may, with certain
exceptions, be instituted only pursuant to an order from the King in
Council or his delegate. The very essence of this provision is to allow
considerations of general policy to prevail."6 To revert to the principle
aut dedere aut punire, it is apparent that strict application leaves no
room for any political control over law enforcement. This is what creates
the problem; the state has tied its own hands.
The only system suppressing hijacking which has ever progressed into
a single convention is the one found in the Convention for the Prevention
and Punishment of Terrorism in 1937." True, the Convention only
included rare types of hijackings (such as Operator Abu Thalaat), because it was directed against armed attacks on aircraft and aircraft
4

1 See,

.g., P. DEVLIN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND 17-20 (1960).
Mankiewicz, Le Projet de Convention, 1970 REVUE FRANCAISE DE DROIT AERIEN 141,
150 (1970).
'5 Minutes of Seventeenth Session of ICAO Legal Committee, ICAO Doc. 8877LC/161, 69 (1970).
"See BACKMAN et al, KOMMENTAR TILL BROTTSBALKEN 1, Brotten mot person och
formogenhetsbrotten m. m. 64 (2d ed. 1964).
"7The English text of the convention is reproduced in 7 A COLLECTION OF THE
TEXTS OF MULTIPARTITE INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS OF GENERAL INTEREST 862
(M. Hudson ed. 1941). The French text is reproduced in 1938 REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET DE LEGISLATION 62 (1938). [hereinafter cited as 1937 Convention].
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sabotage, and only hijackings eiusdem generis were covered."9 It did,

however, come to grips with the political element in the criminal picture,
and it was, at the time when it was opened for signature, able to rally
the support of states which since have become very important in the
hijacking picture, viz, Cuba, Egypt, Greece, Turkey, the Soviet Union
and France. In many respects, it is therefore more profitable to deal
with the 1937 Convention than with the draft convention on aerial hijackings produced during 1969 and 1970 within the ICAO framework,
which avoids the problems resulting from the political element."9 As a
practical matter, the chances of success of the later conventions are
dependent upon the favorable attitudes of the destination states in most

hijackings. Proper attitudes can only be achieved if these states conclude
that the political implications do not exist, and it is doubtful that the
supporters of the 1970 convention will be able to influence this conclusion.
Under the Terrorism Convention, terrorist activities were made extraditable crimes between the contracting states, but the extraditing state

was entitled to make the extradition subject to any conditions and limitations recognizable under the law of that state." Should extradition fail
because of such restrictions, it becomes the duty of the extraditing state
to punish perpetrators of the criminal acts as if they had been committed within the state territory." Donnedieu de Vabres has characterized
the Convention on Terrorism as "realiste et transactionnel."" He bases

his judgment on the way in which the political issue was confronted
and subsequently mastered. It was anticipated that mutually hostile
states participating in this joint fight against crime would, at times, be
'81937 Convention, art. 1, para. 2, states: "In the present Convention, the expression
'acts of terrorism' means criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons, or a group of persons
or the general public." Under art. 2 contracting states undertook to make a criminal
offense of the following acts if they were directed against another contracting state and
if they constituted acts of terrorism: "Wilful destruction of, or damage to, public property or property belonging to or subject to the authority of another High Contracting
Party." As already noted in de Vabres, Le Repression Internationale Terrorisme, 1938
REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET DE LEGISLATION COMPAREE 37, 46, the convention
covered terrorist acts which compromised the safety of the air traffic of several contracting states and provided that the enterprise operating the traffic was owned by the
state or at least franchised by it. Among recent cases of armed attacks on aircraft which
would be per se subject to the convention, if in force, may be mentioned the attacks in
Athens, Dec. 26, 1968, and in Zurich, Feb. 18, 1969, both against El Al aircraft. Among
recent cases of aircraft sabotage, likely to fall under same convention if in force, may
be mentioned the sabotaging of Swissair flight 303 and Austrian Airlines flight 402 on
Feb. 21, 1970. See also the sabotaging of Iberia flights, 411, 423 and 511 on May 10,
1970.
19Cf. ICAO Doc. 8877-LC/161, 171 (1970) (statement of Mr. Stravropoulos at the
17th Session).
20 1937 Convention, art. 8.

"Id., arts. 9 & 10.
See DE VABRES, supra note 18, at 61.
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embarrassed. Such embarrassment could easily follow from a strict application of the doctrines of "soumettre l'inculpe a des jurisdictions
etrangeres dont i I' redoute la pertialite," and, in the case of a domestic
trial, "s'exposer . . . a l'a lea d'une sentence grosse, peut etre, de complications: acquittment scandaleux, condamnation injustment severe
que dictera a des juges populaires une opinion ignorante et surexcitee."''
The solution to the political dilemma was for the faculty to refer the
whole proceeding to an international penal court, set up under a twin
convention.' Donnedieu de Vabres' point is not unlike that of Pontius
Pilate facing the tumultuous crowd. In getting rid of an embarrassing
case, the government in trouble can say, like the old Roman when he
washed his hands before the multitude: "I am innocent of the blood of
this just person. '
II.

THE SCOPE OF THE PRESENT DAY PROBLEM

At this point it is useful to relate the work thus done to present day
conditions. The problem of bringing hijackers to jusfice has two sides,
extradition and domestic trial.
As to extradition, the European practice in the shadow of the cold
war has been that fairly little is required in order to confer a degree of
political character on hijacking, so that extradition will often be refused.
This has been well-established since the Swiss refused, in 1952, to grant
extradition to Yugoslavia of Yugoslavian pilot Ivo Kavic who had hijacked a JAT airliner and brought it to Zurich."
As punishment, European cases indicate a rising reaction against
aerial hijackings. While these cases do not challenge the principle of
asylum, they nonetheless set penalties. Although these cases do not
relate to a special crime of air piracy, but rather to a combination of
other crimes, by the summer of 1970 the sentences imposed in these
cases almost uniformly reached the level of two years imprisonment.
The occurrence of Operation Abu Thalaat sent jitters through the
European courts, and in several subsequent judgments the sentences
were more than doubled.
The following cases are indicative of the trend. Panichi Maurizio and
Giovine Umberto, who as part of their struggle against the Greek gov23Id.,

at 60.

2

4 Cf. Hudson, The Proposed International Criminal Court, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 549

(1938); Note, The Convention for the Creation of an International Criminal Court, 19
Y.B. OF INT'L L. 216 (1938).
1 Matthew 27:24 (King James).
21 In re Kavic, Bjelanovic and Arsenijevic, 1952 INT'L L.R. 371 (1952). This Swiss
case set the pattern for subsequent extradition decisions, as evidenced by Regina v.
Governor of Brixton Prison, Ex parte Kolczynski, 1 Q.B. 540, (1954), 1954 INT'L L.R.
240. See generally Note, The Notion of Political Offences and the Law of Extradition,
31 BRIT. Y.B. OF INT'L L. 430, 434 (1954).
BRIT.
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emnment forced an Olympic plane to return to Orly on November 8,
1968, were tried by a local French court and found guilty of intentional
violence and illegal possession of firearms and were sentenced to five
and eight months imprisonment, respectively." One year later, the
LOT hijackers, Peter Klemt and Hans Ulrich von Hof, forced an aircraft to come down at Tegel Airport in the French sector of Berlin on
October 19, 1969. They were tried by a French military court and
found guilty of: (1) having compromised the security of the working of
an airline; (2) of having endangered the lives of the people on board;
and (3) of unlawful coercion. Both were sentenced to two years imprisonment.28 Romuald Zolotucho and Wieslaw Szymankiewicz, who
hijacked another LOT aircraft on November 20, 1969, and forced it to
land at Vienna-Schwechat airport, were tried by a local Austrian court,
found guilty under Austrian law and sentenced to two years and two
years and three months imprisonment, respectively.29 In June 1970 two
decisions by a Greek and a Swedish court continued this trend. Three
Palestinians, Sami Abboud, Issam Doumid and Maha Abu Khalil whose
attempts to hijack TWA flight 841 on December 21, 1969, failed, were
each sentenced by a local Greek court to two years imprisonment."0 A
dissident Greek, Giorgious Flamourides, who hijacked Olympic flight
944 on January 2, 1969, and forced the pilot to land in Cairo instead
of Athens, was sentenced by a Swedish city court to one year and ten
months imprisonment." After Operation Abu Thalaat the picture
changed. Rudolf Cihac, who with his wife and seven more hijacked a
Czechoslavakian C.S.A. airliner bound for Prague on June 8, 1970, and
forced it to Nuremberg, was sentenced to two years and six months
imprisonment in Nuremberg on September 16.2 Zbigniew Iwanicki,
who hijacked a LOT airliner bound for Gdansk, Poland, on June 5,
1970, and forced it to land at Kastrup, Denmark, was sentenced to six
years imprisonment on October 5, 1970, by a local Danish court.
Raphaele Minichiello, the United States Marine, who on October 31,
1969, succeeded in forcing TWA flight eighty-five to take him for a
6,900 mile ride to Rome, was sentenced by a local Roman court to
seven and a half years imprisonment on November 11, 1970."
27

1969

REVUE GENERALE DE L'AIR ET DE L'ESPACE

358.

28 Tribunal de gouvernement militaire francais de Berlin, 1969.
29

Judgment of Mar. 11, 1970, Landgericht fur Strafsachen Wien, (6 c. Vr. 8513/69).

20

Int'l Herald Tribune, Jun. 25, 1970, § 1, at 4, cols. 6-7.

21

Stockholms radjusratt, avdelning 17, judgment DB 523 (1969)

peal).
2 Judgment of Sep. 16, 1970, Landgericht Nurnberg-Furth,
86/70 a-f) (appeal filed).
31 Taarnby Ret, judgment in case 169/70 (appeal filed).
34 Int'l Herald Tribune, Nov. 12, 1970, § 1, at 1, cols. 1-4.

(affirmed on ap-

(7 AK 67/70 KLs
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These cases, however, display little of the political element. Only in
the first French case, the Olympic hijacking, was there any political
agitation in connection with the trial;' it seems unlikely that the agitation had any influence on the rather light sentences.
The central problem with which the drafters of the twin conventions
on terrorism were concerned is better revealed by the Tsironis case in
Sweden.' On August 16, 1969, en route between Athens and Jannina,
domestic Olympic DC-3 flight 500/1 was hijacked by passengers
Tsironis, his wife and their two boys. Tsironis pointed a gun at the
pilot and said: "I am Doctor Tsironis, in the name of freedom and
humanity, I have taken this aircraft and from now on you shall obey
my orders and those of my colleagues with regard to the course we are
going to follow." Tsironis then forced the pilots to land in Albania
where the hijackers were allowed to leave. Dr. Tsironis sought entry into
Italy and France, but was refused, and finally arrived in Sweden after
receiving permission to take up residence." Under Swedish law, an alien
who has committed an act outside of Sweden which was punishable
under the criminal law in the state of the act should be tried according
to Swedish law and in a Swedish court if he has subsequently acquired
domicile in Sweden." In seeking sanctuary in Sweden, Tsironis had
brought upon himself the possibility of prosecution. Although Sweden
had nothing to do with the hijacking as such-it was not the state of
registry nor the state of landing nor the state within which the crime had
taken place-it nevertheless claimed jurisdiction over the crime. Inasmuch as jurisdiction is established, the Swedish experience would seem
to be illustrative vis-d-vis other cases in which jurisdiction to prosecute
out-of-state hijackings may be assumed,"' raising grave political complications.
In order to understand the significance of the Swedish case, it is necessary to mention the political facts. At the time of Tsironis' entry into
Sweden, the political situation between the victim country to the hijacking (Greece and Sweden) had for some years been characterized
by open hostility. The Swedish ambassador to Greece had been withdrawn, and at the same time, the Swedish government had sought other
See Note, 1969 JURIS CLASSEUR PERIODIQUE 16023 (1969).
6Although the case has not been brought to trial as of this writing, it provides excellent examples of the problems feared.
37
See Sundberg, Flygkapningar-om utlandska brott och inlandsk politik, 1970
SVENSK JtRISTTIDNING 417, 424 (1970).
a'SWEDISH PENAL CODE, Ch. 2 (1970).
"' The relevance of the Swedish experience, of course, gains considerably from the
fact that The Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft
(1970) calls upon contracting states to take jurisdiction over a foreign hijacking where
the alleged offender is only present in its territory, and it does not extradite him. Convention, art. 4, para. 2; i.e., a rule closely similar to the one prevailing in Swedish penal
law.
3
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ways to participate actively in Greek political life. A Greek politician had
been invited to take up residence in Sweden at the expense of the government in order to plan and lead, from Sweden, the struggle of his
political organization in Greece. It was reported that this activity on
Swedish soil even covered resort to armed force inside Greece.' When
Tsironis arrived in Sweden, he referred to his previous position as a
politician in Greece and asked for treatment similar to that enjoyed by
his counterpart. "1 This request was favorably received by Swedish authorities who went to considerable lengths to provide him with an
economic basis and to shield him from any actions by the Greek Government. It appeared that during the initial period following his arrival
Tsironis was given an allowance equivalent to about $2,000 a month
for support.
When the question was raised whether, in view of the Swedish conception of its criminal jurisdiction, the hijacking could be left unpunished, the Chief State Prosecutor ordered a preliminary police inquiry.
From the outset this police inquiry proceeded along two channels. With
regard to the state of landing, Albania, with which friendly relations
were maintained, the inquiry proceeded by means of. the diplomatic
channel. This inquiry yielded only a cable reproducing the Albanian
official news bulletin for the day on which Tsironis landed in Albania.
As to the victim state, Greece, it was decided to avoid the diplomatic
channel as well as the slightly more technical ICAO channel, both of
which would involve political embarrassment. Instead, it was decided to
rely on the Interpol routine which functioned pursuant to the European
Convention On Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters. ' On November
27, 1969, the local Swedish police initiated such a request for assistance.
However, after about a year the request had produced almost no results.
Indeed, the only evidence against the hijacker that the Swedish police
managed to get was a translation of the flight report turned into the air
traffic department of Olympic Airways by the captain of the aircraft.
This piece of evidence was volunteered to the police from a private
source. It is no surprise that the slight Greek response to the Swedish
police request was due to the awareness by the Greek Government of
the political embarrassment that the situation involved for the Swedish
Government. Suffice to say the Greeks were not disposed to diminish
this embarrassment. The result of the inquiry presented the Swedish
Government with no easy choice. It may have been tempting to drop the
case in view of the unsatisfactory evidence. The only solid evidence
Int'l Herald Tribune Aug. 23, 1968.
41See memorandum of Jan. 20, 1970, reported in Sundberg, La PiraterieAerienne,
1970 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PENAL 173, n.29 (1970).
40

42472 U.N.T.S. 185, art. 15, para. 5.
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against the hijacker was his own self-incriminating statements, although
he was also known to have said that the pilots had been only too pleased
to do as he said. It was also tempting to drop the case in view of the
political agitation which might attend the trial, since the general public
might find it "unfair to proceed against men who came to Sweden with
official help and were treated by the authorities not as criminals but
rather as honored guests."'" Not until after Operation Abu Thalaat on
October 16, 1970, was it decided by the King in Council to direct a
prosecution against Tsironis and to take the risk of an acquittal that
might be denounced as scandalous on the one hand and an excessive
sentence in a bending-over-backwards reaction on the other.
The Tsironis case has an even greater significance. It is reflective of
an evolution related to the moralizing tendency found today in a number of Western countries and particularly in Sweden. Such a foreign
policy is likely to oppose every country pursuing a policy not satisfying
local demand. A socialistic and moralistic policy of the kind found in
modem Sweden can hardly avoid engendering a state of general hostility between itself and countries with socialistic leanings. One result of
this state of affairs is that an enemy of a nation unfriendly with Sweden
is certain to find a sanctuary in Sweden.
The political conditions of the world being what they are, many, if
not most, hijackings have been cases of escape from non-socialist countries to Cuba. For economic and political reasons, however, Cuba is
reluctant to harbor all escaping hijackers. It appears that people in
Cuba are now becoming aware of the sanctuary offered by Sweden, as
suggested by the Fuentes case. On February 5, 1969, Leonardo Dominguez Fuentes, a military policeman, secured his escape from Colombia
to Cuba by hijacking a domestic DC-4 flight of Sociedad Aeronautica
Medellin. After spending three months in a camp in Cuba, he was denied
immigration entry. With Cuban identity papers he was then sent to seek
entry to Switzerland, via Prague. Rejected by the Swiss, he spent the
rest of the year in Prague at the expense of the Cuban consulate and a
Latin American student organization. When he found out that the
Czechoslavakian authorities would probably send him back to Colombia
once the Cuban consulate decided to cut off his support, he flew to
Sweden and asked for asylum on January 18, 1970." The Fuentes case
is very similar to that of Tsironis, although Fuentes does not claim to be
a politician, and the Swedish foreign policy has not been as preoccupied
with Colombia as with Greece. While the Tsironis case is unique, Fuentes
is not since there are scores of hijackings in Latin America which have
43 London Daily Telegraph, Mar. 10, 1970, § 1, at 11.
44

See Sundberg, La Piraterie Aerienne, 1970
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produced closely similar cases. ' In view of the idolization of Latin
American revolutionaries in Sweden-the Guevara cult-the embarrassment of making Fuentes stand trial in Sweden would be equal to, if
not greater than, that which might surround the prosecution of Tsironis.
However, after a lengthy delay, the Swedish Government ordered a
prosecution against Fuentes.
The political embarrassment which may be felt in connection with
the entry of hijackers is not exclusively a Swedish phenomenon, but
rather one felt by many states. Austria, a country almost surrounded by
the Iron Curtain, receives a considerable number of refugees from the
socialist countries in the east. Political asylum is granted liberally, but
having a declared status of neutrality, Austria attempts to follow a policy
of retaining good relations with those countries. There is public indignation with both policies-the political system of the eastern bloc is disliked but so is the phenomenon of hijackings. Every hijacking across
the Iron Curtain is likely to give rise to political complications. When
Szymankiewicz and Zolotucho hijacked an LOT airliner and forced it
to land at Vienna on November 20, 1969, a Polish diplomatic demarche
followed. ' The sentence ultimately pronounced against the hijackers by
the local district court was generally considered "neither hot or cold,"
and I am informed that between the lines of the general comment in the
Austrian press one could detect a certain feeling of relief. Since an
appeal to the higher courts would certainly have brought up the political
implications of the case, no appeal was taken.
Even Denmark, a small Scandinavian country belonging to NOTA,
has lately experienced some escapes from Iron Curtain countries by
hijacking. In the case of Zbigniew Iwanicki, who hijacked a LOT airliner on June 5, 1970, Poland is reported to have made several vigorous
attempts to obtain his extradition." Even though extradition was rejected by Denmark, a six-year jail sentence was imposed. Such a heavy
sentence was more than a side-effect of Operation Abu Thalaat, but
probably resulted from the Polish pressure.
Italy, too, experienced this type of embarrassment over Raphaele
Minichiello. His deed was immediately exploited locally. Melito Irpino,
his Italian home town, made his American counsel an honorary citizen,
and film magnate Carlo Ponti announced that he wanted to make a
film out of his feat. Political pressure groups were formed to prevent
I A UPI telegram of Nov. 13, 1970 (published in The London Times, Nov. 14,
1970, 5 1 at 3, col. 7), reveals that four men suspected of an attempt to hijack an aircraft from the Dominican Republic to Cuba had flown into Sweden same day and asked
for asylum. France had refused them entry.
" Intl Herald Tribune, Nov. 21, 1969, § 1, at 1, col. 6, and Mar. 12, 1970, S 1, at
5, col. 4.
" See Int'l Herald Tribune, Sept. 8, 1970, 1, at 2, col. 6.
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Minichiello's extradition to the United States."8 While extradition was
quickly rejected, it was more than a year before the trial started. Apparently, this gave Italy a welcoming cooling-off period which quieted
most of the political uproar.
Political embarrassment may not only follow the wider political context. When hijacking is part of a guerilla war campaign, every state in a
position to try hijackers will find the proceedings very difficult because
the hijacking of an aircraft belonging to the flag airline of the state itself
may result. Undoubtedly, this was part of the reason why the hijackers
of the Olympic aircraft were greeted by the personal representative of
President Nasser and later were personally congratulated by the late
president himself. " The Swedish experience is important because, according to a recent public opinion poll, Sweden ranks among the three
best governed nations in the world." Sweden may, therefore, be assumed to have a wide-spread reputation as a well-organized country with
a reasonably honest administration. Even if Sweden is hampered in its
law enforcement by the attendant political embarrassment accompanying
hijackings, how much worse must it be for countries with a less solid
state apparatus and with more political passion, such as Cuba or the
Arab states? Moreover, these countries form the bulk of the target areas
for hijackings.
Secretary General U Thant noted in a speech to an American audience: "In your country a Democrat does not applaud a robber because
he has robbed a Republican and vice versa. But internationally, this is
exactly what all too frequently happens."" Only the repeatedly victimized
states and those far removed from the focus of political conflict are
capable of unqualified denunciation of aircraft hijackings. When political
temper becomes heated, the indiscriminate fight against hijackings loses
much of its attraction for the political leadership, and air services are
unlikely to receive privileged treatment. For example, incidents from the
telegraphic union have shown that telecommunications can expect no
immunity when the political passion wants to force a change such as
the domestic politics in South Africa or Rhodesia. Air services can
expect no different treatment. This could explain the disconcerting outcome of the vote in the United Nations on December 12, 1969: of 126
"' See Time, Nov. 14, 1969, at 30.
49Int'l Herald Tribune, July 24, 1970, § 1, at 2, col. 6.
50' This was the result of a Gallup Poll of June 26, 1970, which was based on ques-

tions derived from a scientifically selected sample of names included in "The International Year Book and Statesmen's Who's Who," which covers 40 nations. Switzerland

was considered the best governed country; Britain came second; the United States ranked
sixth. Int'l Herald Tribune, June 27, 1970, § 1, at 1, col. 3.
" U Thant Speech, supra note 8.
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delegations, 59 refused to associate themselves with a resolution regarding the anathema of hijackings."
III. CONCLUSION

The political embarrassment in aircraft hijacking cases is like that
anticipated by the drafters of the twin conventions on terrorism of
1937." The Convention for the Creation of an International Criminal
Court was opened to signature on November 16, 1937, and signed by
twelve European powers, and one non-European power. A court was
to be set up for the trial of persons accused of violating the Convention
for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism. Instead of punishing
these offences in its own courts, or extraditing the accused persons, a
party to the convention might remit an accused person to the International Criminal Court for trial, although it would be under no obligation to do so. The court, which was to be permanent at The Hague,
was to consist of five judges and five deputy judges of different nationalities. The judges would be specialists in criminal law, chosen by the
Permanent Court of International Justice from jurists nominated by the
contracting states for a term of ten years. Only five members of the
court would sit in any one case. The Registry of the World Court would
be asked to serve the new court. The salaries of the judges, on a fixed
scale, would be paid by the states of which they were nationals.
The conflict of laws problems encountered by the court would be
solved by resort to a dual system of law: lex loci delicti and the law of
the state that tried the accused. In each case, the penalty was to be
controlled by the more lenient of the two systems. Otherwise, the court
itself was the sole arbiter of conflict of laws questions. If this resulted in
the application of a legal system not represented among the judges on
the bench, a consultative assessor specializing in that system would be
invited to sit. Arrest and detention of the accused during trial was decided by the court; execution was left to the state in which the court
was sitting. Letters rogatory could be sent by the court itself and the
court could call witnesses and experts on its own motion. The costs of
operations were to be provided out of common fund.
Penalties imposed were to be executed by the state which the court
had selected for this purpose, provided that the selected state assented.
The same state could pardon the criminal, after consulting with the
court. Money received from fines could be disposed of by the court in
its discretion.
In discussing the viability of the 1937 treaty, with such terrorism in
"2Cuba voted against the resolution, indicating that it opposed any multilateral solution of the hijacking problem.
I See note 17 supra.
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the air as the "burning examples of ...the state of lawlessness in which
the world finds itself under present-day technological circumstances,"..
it would be unusual to ignore a treaty complex related to armed ag-

gression against aircraft and aircraft hijackings. The basis of the 1937
Convention was to offer a judicial solution to an important evil pestering
the world. As such, it should be compared with the technical solutions
propagated by the ICAO machinery. In aviation, this comparison results in a very forceful argument in favor of the judicial solution: money.
The security measures adopted by ICAO militate against the facilitation

program in Annex 9 to the Chicago Convention.' Only a year ago that
program was thought to be essential to the economic success of the new
equipment already ordered by the airlines." If full implementation of
these measures means a step backwards only in those countries that

have reached a high level of facilitation, it certainly means a heavy
retardation of further development with consequential economic impact." Furthermore, the costs of all the technical measures relied upon

by the industry have to be met, ultimately by that same industry. The
recent controversy about which country should pay for American sky
marshals who fly on some international flights58 has brought one aspect
of this problem into the open. Conversely, any legal solution is gratuitous

insofar as the aviation industry is concerned, because the cost is borne
by society at large.

The basic evil behind the spree of hijackings is political. It is important
to realize that the world is more deeply split politically than is officially
or even generally acknowledged. Therefore, solutions that take the

political element into account are more useful than superficial solutions
which ignore the political implications.
Whatever its shortcomings, the 1937 treaty comes to grips with the
basic evil that we face today. In order to make the beneficial aspects of
' U Thant Speech, supra note 8.
55
1CAO Doc. No. A/17/1O (1968).
Johnson, Introduction to Facilitation, 73 THE AERONAUTICAL JOURNAL 853, 854
(1969).
51Generally speaking, the security specifications and practices are naturally in conflict
with the spirit of the standards expressed in Annex 9, points 2.1, 2.2, 3.1, 3.2, 4.1 and
4.2. Inspection of baggage at departure is in conflict with 3.23 and 3.24 unless the
measure is covered by the "special circumstances" clause. Any screening, time delay
and decompression test of air cargo is contrary to the philosophy of 4.6, 4.8, 4.9 and
4.10. Restrictions in the acceptance and handling of air mail are in conflict with 4.45.
Security checks of transit and transfer passengers, baggage and other load are beyond
the intentions of 5.1 and 5.3, unless the conflict is alleviated by the "special circumstances" clause. Body search of departing, transit and transfer passengers has not been
foreseen in Annex 9, but could be considered as an interference with human rights.
For this summary of the problem, I am indebted to Mr. B. Rosenvinge, Facilitation
Coordinator of the SAS.
11 Acting through director-general Knut Hammarksjold, IATA protested on Oct. 8,
1970, against a United States plan to add $2 to international fares to pay for sky marshals to guard against hijackings. Int'l Herald Tribune, Oct. 10, 1970, § 1, at 3, col. 7.
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its program felt, the 1937 solution does not require implementation,
except in the hijacking target areas. As a practical matter, this includes
only a few states which are either intrinsicly weak or which have brought
the problem upon themselves by excessive encouragement of local political passion. There is considerable merit in this feature, which requires world-wide implementation to be effective. Looking at this handful
of states, there may be some merit in the fact that a number of them
already have associated themselves with the 1937 conventions. If there
is a loss of prestige in accepting a multilateral solution to the basic
problem, at least it must be psychologically easier to ratify a treaty already signed than to bring oneself to sign a convention which one has
denounced already before it was drafted." Perhaps attention should be
drawn to the fact that among those states which remained ominously
absent from The Hague Conference were Cuba, Jordan and Iraq. The
recently formed union between Syria and, for example, the United Arab
Republic, which was present, makes it difficult to say whether Syria was
present at the conference in spite of the absence of any Syrian delegation.
Since the Second World War, attention has not been focused on the
practical idea of an interational criminal court designed to deal with
everyday violations of international law. Attention has rather turned
towards international courts only for exceptional crimes of the type with
which the multinational Nuremberg Military Tribunal was confronted.
But the idea of an international criminal court for everyday crimes
never completely died. As late as 1969, the Tenth Congress of International Criminal Law resolved to recommend that disputes relating to
the extradition for international crimes should be referred to an international criminal court."0
The upsurge of hijackings involving political elements has recently
recreated an atmosphere sympathetic to the concept of an international
criminal court to deal with hijackers along the lines of the 1937 Convention." The idea was first aired on March 24, 1970, in the course of a
lecture on air piracy in Rome. The idea received such a response in the
Italian press that I was encouraged to go on with the idea as Reporter
to the Committee on Piracy, Sea and Air of the International Law Association. While a draft resolution calling for the setting up of an international criminal court for hijackers failed to be adopted at the I.L.A.
session on August 24, 1970, two weeks later Operation Abu Thalaat
prompted Secretary General U Thant to suggest that "all Governments
"' The fact that the 1937 treaty complex is attached to the League of Nations machinery is believed to present no practical difficulty in reviving the treaties in the United
Nations context. See Myers, Liquidation of the League of Nations Functions, 42 AM.
J. INT'L L. 320 (1948); Eek, Folkratten 122 (1968).
'o Congress of International Criminal Law, 10th Sess. (Oct. 1969).
61 Sundberg, Relazione, 17 TRASPORT AEREi 5, 20 (1970).
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pledge themselves to extradite hijackers, irrespective of their nationality
or political affiliation, and bring them before an agreed international
tribunal."'" This suggestion harmonizes well with what the terrorist conventions of 1937 hoped to achieve. The most practical way of implementing U Thant's suggestion seemingly would be to expand the scheme
of the 1937 Court Convention slightly, thus linking the Convention for
the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism and the new hijacking
convention hammered out and adopted at the diplomatic conference
which met at The Hague on December 1-16, 1970.3 If a similar approach is used, it would not be too long before U Thant's proposal
could be carried out in legal practice. Since most experts agree that,
insofar as hijackings and aircraft terrorism are concerned, we are only
at the beginning of a long road, the proposed international court seems
to be the best way of minimizing the evils. Resort to the 1937 Convention seems to be the most promising way of coping with the practical
problems raised by these proposals.

2

U Thant Speech, supra note 8.
" In order to carry this out, the only drafting which seems necessary is a revision of,
or an amendment to, art. 2 of the Convention for the Creation of an International
Criminal Court, 1937. Express reference to the Court Convention was not considered
necessary in the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism. Similarly
then, it should not be required in The Hague Convention on hijackings.

APPENDIX*
TABLE I
1970-71 HIJACKINGS
to 7-31-71
State of
Aircraft
Registry
Brazil
United States
United States
Netherlands
United States

Date
Hijacked
Hijacker
1-2-70 six men; two women
1-7-70 single man
1-9-70 single man
1-26-70 single man
2-17-70 man, woman, two
children
United States
3-13-70 man, wife, four
children
3-18-70 single man
United States
3-26-70 man and woman
Argentina
Japan
3-31-70 fifteen students
Britain
5-2-70 single man
Columbia
5-22-70 single man
United States
5-26-70 single man
5-26-70 woman and son
United States
Italy
5-31-70 single man
Columbia
6-1-70 two men
Italy
6-1-70 single man
United States
6-5-70 single man
Poland
6-6-70 single man
6-9-70 four men; four women
Czechoslovakia
Iran
6-22-70 three men
United States
6-23-70 single man
Argentina
7-5-70 two men
Saudi Arabia
7-13-70 single man
Greece
7-23-70 six Arab guerrillas
Mexico
7-26-70 four men
United States
8-3-70 single man
Czechoslovakia 8-9-70 three men
United States'
8-20-70 three men
Poland
8-20-70 three men; two women
United States 8-21-70 single man
United States 8-25-70 single man
United States 9-13-70 Arab guerrillas
Switzerland
9-13-70 Arab guerrillas
United States

9-13-70 Arab guerrillas

Algeria
Romania
Britain
Thailand
United States

9-14-70
9-15-70
9-16-70
9-20-70
9-20-70

single man
three men
Arab guerrillas
single man
single man

Recipient
State
Cuba
Switzerland
Lebanon
Cuba
Cuba

Type of
Coercion
armed
knife
armed
armed
gun; gasoline

Cuba

gun

gun
armed
swords; bombs
armed
armed
armed
gun
toy pistol
armed
toy pistol
gun; razor; gasoline
grenade
armed
armed
gun
gun
armed
armed; explosives
gun; bombs
armed
armed
gun; grenade
grenade
armed; bomb
armed; bomb
gun; explosives
gun; knife;
explosives
gun; knife
Jordan
explosives
Yugoslavia
armed
West Germany armed
Jordan
armed
North Vietnam armed
gun; gasoline;
Cuba
explosives
Cuba
Cuba
North Korea
Cuba
Cuba
Cuba
Cuba
Egypt
Cuba
Egypt
Cuba
Denmark
West Germany
Iraq
Egypt
Cuba
Syria
Egypt
Cuba
Cuba
Austria
Cuba
Denmark
Cuba
Cuba
Egypt
Jordan

*Compiled from N.Y. Times, CUMULATIVE INDEX 1969, 1970, 1971; Evans, Aircraft
Hijackings: Its Cause and Cure, 63 AM. J. INT'L.L. 695, 697-98 (1969). The editors express sincere appreciation to Mr. Michael C. McClintock for his assistance in the collection of the data.
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State of
Aircraft
Registry

Date
Hijacked

Soviet Union
Soviet Union
United States
United States
Iran
Saudi Arabia
United States
United States
Ethiopia

10-16-70
10-28-70
11-1-70
11-3-70
11-10-70
11-11-70
11-14-70
1-4-71
1-23-71

United States
South Korea
India
United States
United States
United States
Philippines

1-23-71
1-24-71
1-31-71
2-5-71
2-26-71
3-9-71
3-30-71

man and son
two students
single man
single man
nine men
single man
single man
two men
members of Eritreau
Liberation Front
single man
two men
members of P.L.F.
single man
single man
single man
five men

States
States
States
States

4-1-71
5-29-71
5-31-71
6-5-71

single
single
single
single

United
United
United
United

man
man
man
man

United States

6-12-71 single man

Portugal

6-12-71 single man

United States

6-19-71 single man

United States
United States
United States

7-3-71 man and woman
7-24-71 single man
7-25-71 single man

Type of
Coercion

Recipient
State

Hijacker

Turkey
Turkey
Cuba
Cuba
Syria
Syria
Cuba
Cuba
Libya

rifles; grenades
armed
gun
gun
armed
gun
gun
gun
gun

Cuba
North Korea
Pakistan
Cuba
Canada
Miami, Fla.
Communist
China
Cuba
Bahamas
Cuba
Washington,
D.C.
North Vietnam
(intended)
Republic of
Congo
Cuba
(intended)
Argentina
Cuba
Italy (intended)

gun
hand grenade
pistol and grenade
explosives
gun
gun
gun
gun
gun
gun
gun
gun
gun
gun
explosives
pistol
pistol

TOTALS
United States

33

Argentina
Brazil
Columbia
Czechoslovakia
Iran
Italy
Poland
Saudi Arabia
Soviet Union

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

Ethiopia
Greece
India
Japan
Korea
Mexico
Netherlands
Philippines
Portugal
Romania
Switzerland
Thailand

Algeria
Brazil

1

Twenty-three Nations

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
65
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TABLE II
SUCCESSFUL HIJACKINGS (CUMULATIVE)
By YEAR
1948:
1949:
1950:
1952:
1953:
1956:

1958:
1959:
1960:
1961:
1962:
1963:

7
7
3
1
1
1

By

1
4
3
6
2
1

1964:
1966:
1967:
1968:
1969:
1970:
1971:

1
1
5
30
65
46
19 (7-31-71)

STATE OF AIRCRAFT REGISTRY

Alphabetical
Greece
Honduras
Hungary
India
Iran
Israel
Italy
Japan
Mexico
Nationalist China
Nicaragua
Peru
Netherlands

Algeria
Argentina
Bahamas
Brazil
Britain
Bulgaria
Chili
Columbia
Cuba
Czechoslovakia
Ecuador
Egypt
Ethiopia

Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Saudi Arabia
South Korea
Soviet Union
Spain
Switzerland
Thailand
Turkey
United States
Venezuela
Yuogoslavia

Numerical
United States
Columbia
Czechoslovakia

89
15
9

Cuba
Mexico

6

Argentnia
Brazil
Greece
Poland
Venezuela

5
5
5
5
5

Nationalist China
Ethiopia
Philippines
Portugal
Romania
Soviet Union
Britain
Ecuador
Egypt
Hungary
Iran
Italy
Peru
Saudi Arabia
South Korea
Yugoslavia

Algeria
Bahamas
Bulgaria
Chili
Honduras
India
Israel
Japan
Nicaragua
Netherlands
Spain
Switzerland
Thailand
Turkey
Forty States

1
1

1

1
20
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TABLE III
1970-71 SUMMARIES
Recipient State

Type of Hijacker
Single man

35

Cuba

Two or more men

20

Egypt

Man, woman, child

Type of Coercion

29

armed
gun
rifle

5

bomb
grenade
explosives
gasoline

Jordan
Syria

Two or more
men/women

3

Man and woman

2

Woman and child

1

Denmark
North Korea
North Vietnam
Turkey
West Germany

knife
razor
sword
pistol & grenade
pistol & explosives

Argentina
Austria
Bahamas
Canada
China (Communist)
Iraq
Italy
Lebanon
Libya
Pakistan
Republic of Congo
Switzerland
Yugoslavia

toy pistol

TABLE IV
HIJACKING CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES
Nationality of
Forum Court
United States
French
United States
United States
United States
Spain
Germany
United States
Sweden
Italy
United States

Nationality of
Hijacker
United States
East German
United States
United States
United States
Spanish
Czech
United States
Polish
United States
United States

Dates
Conviction
Hijacking

5-8-69
11-21-69
5-16-70
6-5-70
7-7-70
7-10-70
9-17-70
10-6--70
10-6--70
11-12-70
4-24-70

Sentence
Fine Prison Term

10-14-68
10-19-69
1-9-69
12-20-68
2-25-69
$240
6- -70
11- -69
6-5-70
11- -69
9- -70

*Lesser Offense of Interference With Flight Crew Members.

$580

*6 years
2 years
25 years
*2 years
Life term
6 years
21 years
25 years
6 years
71 years
51 years
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TABLE V
HIJACKINGS OF UNITED STATES AIR CARRIERS
Alphabetical

Allegheny
American
Braniff
Continental
Delta
Eastern

National
Northeast
Northwest Orient
Pan American
Piedmont

Southeast
Trans World Airlines
Trans Carribbean
United
Western

Numerical
National

16

United

6

Trans World Airlines

10

Northeast
Northwest Orient

2
2

Allegheny
American
Braniff

11

Eastern
Delta
Pan American

7
7

Continental
Piedmont
Southeast
Trans Caribbean
Western
Sixteen Carriers

